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Overview
Dog bite statuteThe Alabama dog bite statute is section 3-6-1 of Alabama Statutes:
Other grounds for liabilityIf the dog bite statute does not apply, there are other several grounds upon which liability can be based. ScienterIn cases seeking damages for injuries sustained from a dog bite where the statute does not apply, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the owner of the dog had knowledge of, or had reason to know of, the dog's dangerous propensities. Rucker v. Goldstein, 497 So. 2d 491 (Ala. 1986); Allen v. Whitehead, 423 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 1982). The crucial issue is "whether the owner knows, or had reason to know, of the animal's dangerous propensities." Allen v. Whitehead, 423 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 1982). If the plaintiff fails to meet the burden of proof, the defendant is not liable. The dog owner's testimony that she was afraid that her dog might be hostile to a very young child because the dog had been teased by other, older children was sufficient to overcome the dog owner's motion for summary judgment on the issue of knowledge of dangerousness in a dog bite case. White v. Law, 454 So. 2d 515 (Ala. 1984). Fighting with other dogs was not sufficient to prove knowledge of dangerousness to people. Kent v. Sims, 460 So. 2d 144 (Ala. 1984). Breed as basis of knowledge of dangerousnessIn Edgar v. Riley, 725 So.2d 982 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998), the owners of a pit bull were deemed to be aware of its dangerous propensity to attack without warning, even though it never had done so in the past, thereby supporting a jury's finding of civil liability for a dog bite. TrespassTrespassing dog: If a dog trespasses but there is no violation of a local animal control law such as a leash law or running at large law, the dog bite statute cannot be used and therefore the issue will be whether scienter or negligence can be proved. Rucker v. Goldstein, 497 So. 2d 491 (Ala. 1986) ("It is undisputed in this case that the attack on Mrs. Rucker happened off the owner's premises, some nine miles from appellee's home, so that this action is governed by the rules of common law negligence.") Trespassing child: A child who regularly visits a friend and was welcome there, never having been forbidden to go there, is deemed to have the consent and permission of the owner of the property, and is a licensee on the property; as such, the owner is under a duty not to negligently injure him and, therefore, can be held liable when the child is bitten by a dog on the property. Edgar v. Riley, 725 So.2d 982 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998). Landlord liabilityIn a case against a landlord, it was held that the presence of a tenant's vicious dog in areas shared by other tenants constitutes a "dangerous condition" and that a landlord must exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries from such a dangerous condition. Gentle v. Pine Valley Apartments, 631 So. 2d 928 (Ala. 1994). Notice to the premises owner, either direct or imputed, of the dangerous condition is the sine qua non of liability. (Id.) Therefore, in the absence of notice, there can be no liability. (Id.) Injury caused by something other than a biteIn a non-bite case, an owner of a domestic animal is not liable for an injury caused by the animal unless it can be shown that the owner had previous knowledge of the animal's mischievous propensity. Durden v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169 (1844), followed in Buckner v. Goldstein, 497 So. 2d 491 (Ala. 1986). Evidence that a defendant's dogs had chased and barked at people riding bicycles and/or walking, as well as at automobiles, was sufficient to prove that she was aware that her dogs had the propensity to chase and bark at people and cause a fleeing person to fall and incur injury. Davis v. Ulin, 523 So. 2d 365 (Ala. 1988). NegligenceIn Owen v. Hampson, 258 Ala. 228, 62 So. 2d 245 (1952), this Court held that the common law rule of negligence is still applicable to dogbite cases in Alabama. The early case of Durden v. Barnett & Harris, 7 Ala. 169, 170 (1844), set out the rule as follows:
Litigation forms and other materials for attorneys
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