Dog Bite Law

Overview

The State of Missouri follows the one bite rule. (See the One Bite Rule.) This State also permits dog bite victims to base claims upon the doctrine of premises liability, general negligence, and negligence per se.

The best discussion of the one bite rule, premises liability and general negligence when it comes to dog bites can be found in the case of Wilson v. Simmons, 103 S.W.3d 211 (Mo.App. W.D. 02/18/2003).

A little girl was bitten in the throat by a dog owned by neighbors. The dog had occasionally nipped at the daughter of the dog owners, and the dog owners themselves when they were feeding it. This was put into evidence when the defendants moved for summary judgment. There were three alternative theories of recovery: strict liability, premises liability, and negligence.

In entering summary judgment for the dog owners, the trial court found that "a plaintiff seeking to recover damages from a dog bite must prove that the dog owner knew or at least had reason to know of his pet's tendency to bite people, or its 'dangerous propensities.'" The trial court further found that this requirement existed "[r]egardless of the theory upon which the claim is based."

The Court of Appeal reversed. Noting that "[r]ules imposing liability for harm caused by domestic animals find their origin in authority no less ancient than the Pentateuch," the court discussed the differences between the proof required for strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. The court then held that a possessor of land can be held liable to an invitee or licensee entering on the land for a foreseeable danger created by the normally dangerous propensities of a dog.

The court stated that common law strict liability for scienter requires proof of an abnormally dangerous or vicious propensity on the part of the dog or other animal. On the other hand, premises liability is based merely on proof of a normal danger, meaning that the animal in question simply presents a foreseeable danger to humans.

The court reaffirmed that Missouri follows the common law when it comes to abnormally dangerous propensities of which the owner has knowledge. "[O]ur public policy is that if an owner wants to knowingly maintain a vicious dog, he or she will be strictly liable for the injuries caused by the dog."

With respect to a dog that does not possess known vicious dangerous propensities, the rule reflects "a degree of freedom from potential liability" but that degree of freedom from liability is not absolute. The court set forth the circumstances under which the owner of land will be held liable, based on whether the victim is a trespasser, a licensee or invitee:

[P]ublic policy with respect to domestic animals dictates that there be proof that the possessor of the animal, prior to the incident, had some knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities. With respect to premises liability, the elements of proof, including proof of the owner's knowledge of the dangerous propensities of his or her dog, is dictated by the entrant's classification as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. banc 1995). An entrant is deemed a trespasser unless the possessor of the land has given the entrant permission to enter. Id. One who enters the premises of another with permission is a licensee, unless the possessor has a sufficient interest in the visit that it is reasonable to assume that the possessor has made the premises safe for the visit, in which case the visitor is deemed an inivitee. Id. Generally, the possessor owes a trespasser no duty of care; a licensee the duty to make safe dangers known to the possessor; and an invitee the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him or her against both known dangers and those that would be revealed by inspection. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, in a dog bite case pled on a premises liability theory, the possessor is subject to liability for harm to licensees if the dog presents a foreseeable danger to a licensee of which the possessor is aware; and a possessor is subject to liability for harm to an invitee if the dog presents a foreseeable danger to the invitee of which the possessor knows or should have known.

Interestingly, the court stated that "there was nothing in the respondents' motion to suggest that the appellants would not be able to show that the respondents' dog had normally dangerous propensities that constituted a foreseeable danger to a child such as Katie, requiring the respondents to use due care in allowing Katie to have contact with the dog, depending on the circumstances that existed at the time of the incident." The court was referring to the fact that the dog was a Dalmation and the victim was only nine years old.

The case of Like v. Glaze, 126 S.W.3d 783 (Mo.App. 02/03/2004), focused on general negligence and negligence per se. The court noted that "[o]ne who possesses a dog that he does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous is subject to liability from harm caused by that dog only if he is negligent in failing to prevent that harm." See generally Restatement (2d) of Torts, section 518(b) (1981). Unless forbidden by statute, certain animals, such as dogs, are permitted to run at large. See Restatement (2d) of Torts, section 518(b), cmt. j. The court noted that "[t]here may be circumstances, however, where it would be negligent to allow a dog to run at large." Id. at cmt. k. "In these cases," the court said, "there may be liability for negligence upon the same basis as in other negligence cases."

To succeed on a negligence claim, a victim must satisfy the elements of a negligence cause of action: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the owner or custodian of the dog to protect the victim from injury, (2) breach of that duty and (3) proximate cause. In a case where a dog is off leash and there is no leash law, the owner or custodian is considered to have a duty to protect the victim if the former knew or should have known that the dog could cause harm to others if it were allowed to run at large. In this particular case, although the dog was known to bark and jump up when approached by a stranger, there was no genuine dispute that it had never bitten, attacked, or harmed anyone. Therefore it was held that the victim failed to produce sufficient evidence tending to show that it was foreseeable that the dog could cause harm if it were allowed to run at large.

Litigation forms and other materials for attorneys

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