A dog bite victim in Alaska can recover compensation under the doctrines of negligence, negligence per se, scienter, and intentional tort. There is no dog bite statute, so this is a “one bite state.”
Overview
Alaska follows the one bite rule. This means a person can be held liable for a dog attack if the dog had the dangerous propensity to inflict such an injury, and the defendant knew or should have known about that propensity. See The One Bite Rule. In Hale v. O’Neill, 492 P.2d 101 (Alaska 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court referred to “the doctrine of strict liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal with known dangerous tendencies.” The court noted that “an owner of a domestic animal becomes liable, regardless of fault, for injuries caused by the animal which stem from a vicious propensity, known to the owner.” The court described the elements of such an action as being: (1) the animal’s owner knew or should have known of the animal’s “dangerous tendency,” and (2) the dangerous tendency resulted in an injury to the claimant.
Third parties, such as landowners and management companies, can also be held liable if they are aware of a dog’s dangerous propensity to inflict injury and do nothing to prevent it despite having the legal right to do so. See Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986), which also holds that if the defendant or its employee acted with malice or reckless indifference toward the victim’s safety, a jury can award punitive damages.
This state also imposes liability on the grounds of negligence and negligence per se. See below for a discussion of negligence per se.
In Alaska, an injured child’s lawsuit can include a claim for medical expenses reasonably necessary to treat the dog bite. His parents are not required to bring a separate claim in their own name. See Alaskan Village, cited above.
Violating an Animal Control Law is Negligence Per Se
Alaska Applies the General Doctrine of Negligence Per Se
Alaska follows the doctrine of negligence per se when a safety law is violated if certain requirements are met, and the doctrine has been applied in dog attack cases. Thus, the violation of a leash or restraint ordinance designed to protect the public from injuries caused by uncontrolled dogs can constitute negligence per se when the ordinance establishes a definite standard of conduct, the injured plaintiff belongs to the class the ordinance protects, and the injury is of the type the ordinance was intended to prevent. Sinclair v. Okata, 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Alaska 1994); West v. Municipality of Anchorage, 174 P.3d 224, 228 (Alaska 2007).
The leading case about the doctrine in general is Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971). The Alaska Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286, 288A, and 288B. The court held that when a statute or regulation is adopted as the applicable standard of care, an unexcused violation constitutes negligence per se. In other words, an unexcused violation is negligence itself—not merely evidence from which the jury may infer negligence. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1201 (Alaska 1992).
There is, however, an important qualification. The law must prescribe a sufficiently specific standard of conduct. If the statute or ordinance merely says, in substance, that a person must act “reasonably,” “prudently,” or take reasonable precautions, it does not establish the definite standard necessary for negligence per se. The jury then applies ordinary negligence principles.
The Doctrine of Negligence Per Se Supports Dog Attack Cases in Alaska
The doctrine of negligence per se has been applied in a number of Alaska dog attack cases. The most important is Sinclair v. Okata, 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Alaska 1994). The U.S. District Court specifically addressed the Anchorage restraint ordinance. The ordinance provided that a person who owns a dog or cat must keep the animal “under restraint at all times.” The court held that the ordinance established a sufficiently definite standard of conduct and concluded that it would instruct the jury that violation of the restraint ordinance constituted negligence per se. In West v. Municipality of Anchorage, 174 P.3d 224, 228 (Alaska 2007), another dog case, the Alaska Supreme Court cited Sinclair with approval.
For example, imagine a child who is bitten by an unleashed dog in a public park located in a city having an ordinance requiring that dogs be restrained outdoors and not permitted to run at large. That type of law establishes a specific rule of conduct. A child using public property falls squarely within the public that such a law protects. A dog attack is the precise type of physical injury that a restraint law seeks to prevent, and an uncontrolled dog is the precise hazard addressed by the law. Under those circumstances, the violation of the restraint laws would constitute negligence per se and be the proximate cause of the child’s injuries.