A dog bite victim in Arizona can recover compensation under a special statute and the doctrines of negligence, negligence per se, scienter, and intentional tort.
Statutory Strict Liability for Bites
Arizona’s dog bite statute imposes strict liability on dog owners. See Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-1025. There is a statute defining “lawful presence on private property.” See Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-1026. Another statute defines “provocation” in general terms. See Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-1027.
Section 11-1025 imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries their dog causes, without considering the owner’s fault. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985). In Arizona, dogs do not get “one free bite.” Owners are strictly liable for injuries caused by their dogs’ actions, regardless of their knowledge of the dog’s viciousness. Massey v. Colaric, 151 Ariz. 65, 725 P.2d 1099 (1986).
Section 11-1025 does not apply if the victim is a child of and resides with the dog owner and was bitten at the family home. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989). The statute imposes liability only on owners. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988) (error to grant judgment for victim against owner when victim was bitten after the dog had been stolen from the owner). However, there are other causes of action that apply to non-owners.
The only defense to liability under section 11-1025 is proof that the injured party provoked the dog. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 138, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 339 P.2d 389 (1959); James v. Cox, 130 Ariz. 152, 634 P.2d 964 (App. 1981); Toney v. Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402, 631 P.2d 557 (App. 1981). The defense is based on section 11-1027.
Assumption of risk is not a defense. In Massey v. Colaric, 151 Ariz. 65, 725 P.2d 1099 (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
“A.R.S. § 24-378 permits a person injured by a dog while at large to recover simply by proving that the statute has been violated. If the elements of the statute are satisfied, the legislature has decided to impose liability without fault. The only defense provided is provocation, A.R.S. § 24-523, with the common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk superseded.”
In Mulcahy v. Damron, 816 P.2d 270, 169 Ariz. 11 (1991), the court held that a person working at a pet hospital does not assume the risk of being bitten by a dog there for treatment or grooming. The court reiterated that assumption of risk is not a defense to a dog bite in Arizona.
The dog bite statute “does not codify or replace common law liability. It is possible to proceed simultaneously under statutory and common law theories.” Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 138 (Ct. App. 1985).
Statutory Strict Liability for Any Injury When Dog at Large
Arizona has a statute that imposes liability on anyone who allows a dog to run at large, for any injury to a person or property. See Arizona Revised Statutes section 11-1020.
The use of “or” in section 11-1020 indicates that either the owner or another person responsible for a dog may be liable for injury or damage caused by the dog. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988).
In Mulcahy v. Damron, 816 P.2d 270, 169 Ariz. 11 (1991), the defendant dog owners attempted to defend on the basis that a dog at a pet hospital should be considered “at large,” thereby relieving the dog owners from liability because of the word “or” in section 11-1020. The court refused to permit this defense, saying, “[w]hether a dog is at large is determined by two statutory conditions: (1) when a dog is ‘not confined by an enclosure,’ or (2) when a dog is not ‘physically restrained by a leash.'”
Scienter, Negligence, and Negligence Per Se
Arizona permits claims based on common law theories such as scienter, negligence, and negligence per se. The dog bite statute does not codify or replace common law liability, making it possible to proceed under both statutory and common law theories simultaneously. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985). The cause of action created by this section is distinct from the common law, which imposes liability on dog owners only if the owner knew or had reason to know of their animal’s vicious propensities. Murdock v. Balle, supra. A claim pursuant to this section is legally distinct from a common law dog bite claim. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).
A person who violates a statute for public protection and safety is guilty of negligence per se. Good v. City of Glendale, 150 Ariz. 218, 221, 722 P.2d 386, 389 (App. 1986); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 467, 577 P.2d 1084, 1086 (App. 1978); Christy v. Baker, 7 Ariz. App. 354, 355, 439 P.2d 517, 518 (1968).
“The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment . . . whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.” 150 Ariz. at 221, 722 P.2d at 389.
Violation of an ordinance also is negligence per se. “A violation of an ordinance or statute forbidding a party to do a certain act is negligence per se.” Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 57 Ariz. 451, 457, 114 P.2d 904, 906 (1941). See also Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P.2d 249 (1932). “In establishing its existence, the jury need only find that the party committed the specific act prohibited, or omitted to do the specific act required by the statute or ordinance.” Deering v. Carter, 92 Ariz. 329, 333 (1962).
Beware of the Unusual 1-Year Statute of Limitations
A cause of action under Arizona’s dog bite statute has a one-year limitations period. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985). The court held that the one-year statute of limitations applies to the statutory cause of action while the two-year personal injuries statute of limitations applies to the common law cause of action. Id. at 234. Although the statute was numbered differently when the decision was written, it was essentially the same law and therefore the Murdock case would certainly be followed at this time. If your case has passed the one-year period, try to bring it under one of the other causes of action, which can be filed within two years of the incident date.